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Understanding the allocation of labor between collective and private
activities within cooperatives has been an  issue of  interest for economists
and policy makers.  This paper extends existing literature by incorporating
income uncertainty from both private and collective activities, and by
assuming that members are risk averse.  The analysis suggests  a member's
labor  response to policy parameters can be  decomposed into  three components:
the mean effect, reflecting the  labor response under certainty or risk
neutrality;  the variance effect, reflecting the  response to  changes in risk;
and the wealth effect, reflecting the response  to changes  in risk aversion
associated with changes  in wealth.  The analysis demonstrates  the  labor
response may be reversed from the  certainty or risk neutral case,  due  to a
stronger, opposing variance effect.COOPERATIVE LABOR ALLOCATION UNDER UNCERTAINTY
I.  INTRODUCTION
Over the past 40 years, governments and international organizations
have made significant efforts  to  organize and support production
cooperatives, mainly in agriculture.  As Dorner  (1977)  suggested, this
organizational  form promotes both efficiency and equity.  Nevertheless, as
Laidlaw  (1977) points out,  the performance of agricultural production
cooperatives has been disappointing.
The term production cooperative applies  to a wide variety of
organizations from fully collectivized farms where members produce all
commodities jointly to  groups of independent farmers that combine purchase
of inputs and sale  of output.  Most agricultural production cooperatives,
however, have both private and collective plots.  A key problem that hampers
the performance of such cooperatives  is  insufficient contribution of work to
the collective plot.
A potential aid to  increasing member's labor  allocation and, thereby,
production would be an examination of factors affecting a member's
allocation of labor.  Rather than analyzing incentives provided by
government policy instruments,  this paper will  focus on parameters
cooperative members can alter.  The purpose  is to  determine the work
incentives  internal to  the cooperative which can increase participation.
This research builds  on earlier models of Sen (1966),  Bonin (1977),
Chinn (1980),  Israelson (1980),  and Putterman (1980) with respect to  a
member's choice of labor allocation between collective  and private
production.  In the  tradition of these papers, member interaction and  income
1distribution rules are  included as  factors  affecting labor allocation.  Past
studies,  however, have either  ignored or limited the  effects  of uncertainty
on labor allocation.  The model developed  in  this paper provides a
comprehensive characterization of effects  of uncertainty on labor
allocation.  By modeling uncertainty with respect to  returns,  the  source of
uncertainty in  either the private  or collective sector can be price or
yield.  The model specification also  allows private and cooperative returns
to  be correlated.  The analysis will  indicate how uncertainty combined with
risk alters  the  certainty case results  reported by previous  authors.
Early analysis  of cooperative  labor supply assumed cooperatives  were
centralized decision-making  firms with the  objective of maximizing net
returns to members  (Ward,  1958;  Domar, 1966;  and Oi  and Clayton, 1968).  Sen
(1966) was  the first  to establish members  rather than managers  as  the  labor
allocation decision-makers by modeling cooperatives  as a group of utility-
maximizing individuals.
The  literature has  focused generally on the  effects of output price,
fixed charges,  and production quotas  on labor allocation.  However,  income
distribution systems, member  interaction, and uncertainty have also been
identified as affecting labor allocation.  Israelson  (1980) demonstrates
that cooperatives  with income distributed according to  labor shares  provide
more  incentives  to cooperative  labor than do  cooperatives based on equal
income distribution.  Chinn (1979)  demonstrates  that members'
interdependence affects  the labor  allocation responses when members  are  not
identical, and both Chinn  (1980) and Putterman (1980 and 1981b)  have
addressed the  game  theoretic aspects  of member interaction.  Bonin  (1977) in
his model incorporates behavioral  interdependence and production uncertainty
2on the  collective plot and price uncertainty on the private plot.  He
demonstrates  that the  labor allocation response to  government policies under
uncertainty differs  from the  response  in a certain world.  Bonin's  (1977)
work is  expanded here by not limiting  the source of uncertainty  in each mode
of production and by allowing members to vary in their behavioral
assumptions about other members' labor response.
The approach of this research is  to  treat  labor allocation as  a
portfolio selection problem.  Members must allocate  their labor between
production processes with correlated returns and differential uncertainties.
Private and collective incomes  are assumed to be correlated because both
forms of production face  the same weather and market conditions.  The level
of uncertainty will vary for private and cooperative  income, however, due to
differences  in product and technique.
Changes in four variables used to  increase cooperative labor  supply are
analyzed in this  paper.  These four variables  are:  cooperative  income
variability, private and cooperative  income correlation, behavioral
interdependence,  and income distribution rules.  The next  section describes
the model in which these four parameters operate.
II.  COOPERATIVE LABOR SUPPLY MODEL
Consider a producer cooperative consisting of N members.  Each member,
i, allocates  time between work on the collective plot, hc,  and work on
his/her private plot, hP.  If the total work time  is normalized to  one, work
i
allocation is  specified as:
hc + hP = 1.  (1)
i  i
3Member i's  net income  consists of  two  parts:  net income  from  the
private plot, yP,  and income  from  the cooperative  activity,  y
1  c.,p..«  ^ive  activity,  „„  .A  iYC. The total  cooperative net income  is yc;  Ai  is member  i's  share,  which is assumed
to  be a linear combination of a portion based on member  i's relative  supply
of cooperative  labor and a portion based on equal shares.  With Hc
representing the  total  labor allocation to  the cooperative and a
representing the weight given to  equal  shares,  the  formula for member  i's
share of cooperative net  income is:
h?




If a  = O, a member's cooperative  income  is  proportional to his/her labor contribution to  the cooperative;  if a  - 1, each member receives  an equal
share.
When member i determines labor  input to  the cooperative  plot, his/her
perception of other members'  behavior is  used in  the decision.  Therefore,
the values of Ai  and Hc used in member i's  decision reflect ex  anti
perceptions.  The  sum of the members'  labor allocation,  Hc,  can be decomposed into the  contribution of member i, hc,  and the other members'
i cooperative labor supply, HC..  Each member  takes  into account  the  effect of
his/her  labor supply on the other members' labor supply.  Thus,  for member i, the other members' cooperative  labor supply, HCi,  is a function of
member i's  cooperative  labor:
Hc  h c - hc + Hc  (hc). 
(3)
i  i  i  -i  i






To stress  the subjective aspect of this measure, q  will be called a member's
cohesion conjecture.  The value of the cohesion conjecture  is  assumed
between hC/Hc and 1.  If a member acts as  if his marginal behavior has no
affect on other members or if no one follows, the cohesion conjecture takes
the  lower bound;  if there exists perfect cohesion or total  emulation, the
conjecture  equals  1.  The cohesion conjecture, I,  varies among members, is
subjective, and is assumed positive.
Assuming income uncertainty from both private and cooperative
production and using the Just and Pope  (1978) formulation, private  and
cooperative net  income are represented by:
y? - yP(hP) + gP(hP)  eP  i - 1, 2, ...,  N  (4) 1  i  i i
c - yc[hc + Hc  (hC)] +  gC[hc  +  Hc  (hC)]  ec  (5)
i  -i  i  i  -i  i
This  income specification allows for differential mean and variance  effects
for  input factors.  The deterministic sections of private and cooperative
net income are,  respectively, yP and yc;  the stochastic portions are  gPeP
and gCec.  The stochastic structure  encompasses  two elements.  The first
element reflects exogenous  factors which are not affected by members actions
5such as  weather or market conditions.  This stochastic element  of income  is
represented by the pure random terms  eP  and ec.  These pure random terms
have zero mean and covariance of apc - pap ac where p is  the  correlation
coefficient between cooperative and private incomes;  and a2 and a2 are
c  p
cooperative  and private income variability.  The second stochastic element
of income  reflects the  affect of the member's  labor allocation on income
variability and  is  represented by the gP  and gc  functions.  For the  effect
1
of the  labor inputs  on income variability, we assume without loss  of
generality that  gP > 0 and gc >  0.1  With this specification, the marginal
effect of labor on income variability, gc'  and gP',  may increase, decrease,
or be  constant with respect  to their argument.
Let
Yi  - yP +  gPeP + Ai(YC  + gCeC)  (6) 1i  i i
denote  the  income of member i, yi  is  a random variable and, since  the  time




Let a member's wealth at  the end of the season be denoted by
wi - w  + Yi
where w0 is  the  initial wealth of member  i.  Now assume  that member i is i
risk averse with utility function U(-)  defined on wealth;  U' >  0, U''  < 0.
Thus, member i selects  an expected utility-maximizing, time-allocation
scheme which  is  derived solving
6max E(U(wO +  ji))  (7) hc  i7
i
subject to
0 < hC <  1.
i-
Assuming an internal solution,  the first-order condition  is:2
6EU  y \
- -E  U  - 0  (8) Shc 
(8)c
where U w is  the marginal utility of wealth.  The associated second-order
condition holds under concavity of the utility and income functions  in w and
hc respectively.
To examine  the  implications  of  (8),  consider a first  order Taylor's
series approximation of marginal utility about expected wealth (Newbery and
Stiglitz,  1979;  Just and Zilberman,  1983),
U  - Uw + Uw(w  - w)  (9)
where w - w0 + y is  expected wealth while y - yP + Aye  is expected profit.
The Uw and Uw  are  the first and second derivitives  of U at w.
Since w - - - y - y, condition  (9)  can be rewritten:
Uw  - U  + UW(Y  - y).  (10)
Introducing  (10)  into  (8)  yields  an approximation of the  first-order
condition:
71  6EU  6y  R 6V
=  _  _--  =  0
Uw  6h C S6h  2 6hc
1-
or  Sy/ShC _ - R SV/6hc  (11)
2
where R - -Uww/Uw is  the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute  risk aversion at
mean wealth, and V =  E(gPeP + AgCeC)2 is  the variance of profit (and
wealth).  This approximated first-order condition suggests  the optimal  of
labor allocated for cooperative activities occurs when the marginal mean
1-
effect, 6y/6hc,  is  equal  to  the marginal risk effect, - R SV/6hc.  The
2
marginal risk effect consists of the marginal effect of cooperative labor on
the variance  of income, SV/6hc, weighted by the measure of absolute risk
aversion.
Using y - yP + AYC,  the marginal  impact of hc on mean income  is  derived
to be
- 7~yc  r  /A  \  1 Sy  Yc  { 
= (1 - +)(1  a ) - +  a  yP  (12)
ShC HC hC
A
where hc  represents the  average cooperative labor supply as  perceived by
A  A
members  since hc - HC/N.  The value of hC/hc categorizes members  into types
i
of workers.  Member i is  an individualist, average worker, or cooperativist
A
depending on whether hc/hc is  greater than, equal  to,  or less  than one,
i
respectively.3
Using V = gP2 a2 + A2gC2 a2 + 2 ApapacgPgc,  the marginal impact of hc
p  c  P
on the variance of income  is:
86V  gC  hc
- - (gP apc + Agc a2)  1  (-  C)(1  - I) - +  1 +  - - g
Shc  c  Hc  H
- gP'  (gP a2 + Ag  apc).  (13)
P
Under certainty, at the  optimum, the marginal mean income with respect
5y
to hc  is equal  to  zero (  - 0).  The  introduction of uncertainty results
6hc
in an optimal cooperative  labor allocation that equates marginal mean effect
to marginal variance effect.  Assuming y is  concave in hC,  the  introduction
of uncertainty increases  (decreases) labor allocation to  the  cooperative
activity when, at the  optimum, the marginal risk effect is negative
(positive).  If the optimal hc  is  greater with uncertainty  incorporated in
the model than without uncertainty, then the cooperative activity serves as
the safer activity.  The risk averse decision maker gives up expected
profit to  reduce risk by increasing hc beyond the point where 6y/6hc = 0.
5y
For the  same reason when, at the optimum, - > 0, the  collective activity
6hc
is  perceived as  the  riskier activity.
The introduction of uncertainty into the model also extends  the  set of
parameters  influencing member's decisions.  The additional parameters  are
the behavioral parameters  of the risk aversion coefficient and its
derivatives with respect to wealth, and the  technical parameters  of the
covariances  of private and cooperative incomes and their risk response
functions gP and gc.
The impact of parameter x (x  may be a2 , p, 7, a) on cooperative  labor
c
supply is  obtained by differentiating  (11)  with respect to hc  and x.  Such
differentiation will yield the following generic expressions  for cooperative
analysis:
9dhc  1  /5 2y  R 62V  1  V  R \
_  _  _  _  (14) dx  D  6hcSx  2 6hc6x  2 Shc  6x
where
6  /  6Y  R  Va
6hc  6hc  2 Shc 
is  assumed to be positive since  -D is  an approximated second-order condition
derived from (11).  Let  - - SR/S6w  w/R be the  elasticity of absolute risk
aversion with respect to wealth.  Note  that 7 is  equal  to 0 when the member
has  constant absolute risk aversion and is  equal to  1 when the  member has
constant relative  risk aversion.  Following Arrow and assuming decreasing
absolute  and increasing relative risk aversion, it  is  reasonable to  assume
0 < 7 < 1.  Using this  definition and  (11),  the  generic comparative static
results  can be rewritten as:
dhc  1  /  62V  R  2 y Sy 
(15) dx  D  ShCSx  2  hC6x  w  x  hc
(15)
A change  in parameter x may have  three effects  on cooperative labor supply.
First  is  the mean effect resulting from the impact  of x on the marginal
effect of cooperative  labor on expected income.  The second effect  is  the
impact of x on the marginal  effect of cooperative  labor on  the variance  of
income.  This variance effect increases with the  level  of absolute risk
aversion at  average wealth.  The  third effect  is  the wealth effect  on risk
aversion resulting from  the  impact of a change  in expected wealth associated
with the change  in x.  This wealth effect represents  a reduction in risk
10aversion associated with increased average wealth.  This effect strengthens
the mean effect relative  to  the variance effect.  The wealth effect does not
exist when absolute risk aversion is  constant  (7 - 0).
In  the  following section, changes  in model parameters  are analyzed.
Each of the  four parameter changes seems  to be a plausible incentive  for
cooperative  labor.  For example, a cooperative may attempt  to  increase the
supply of cooperative labor by increasing the proportion of cooperative
income distributed based on relative  labor contribution.  Alternatively, a
cooperative may attempt to  increase the  amount of cooperative labor by
choosing to produce products  which either have  low-income variability or
less-income correlation with the privately produced products.  The  fourth
parameter option would be  to foster cohesiveness among members in the belief
that greater cooperative participation would follow.  However,  the
comparative static analysis  of a change  in each of these parameters
demonstrates cooperative  labor supply may not increase.
III.  COMPARATIVE STATIC RESULTS OF POLICY OPTIONS
This  section outlines the  impacts  on cooperative labor supply of
changes  in the  following four variables:  cohesion conjecture;  income
distribution rule;  income correlation;  and cooperative income variability.
The comparative  static equations are  found in the Appendix.
A.  The Impact of an  Increase in  the Cohesion Coniecture. n
An increase  in the  responsiveness of other members' cooperative labor
supply has both an income effect and a relative labor  share effect.  The
income  gain due  to  increased production is  offset by a decline  in a member's
relative  labor share.  Thus,  the  labor allocation response  to an increase  in
11the  cohesion conjecture  is  strongly related to  the  income distribution rule.
1.  Mean Effect
The  following results hold for an  increase  in  the cohesion conjecture
if the mean income effect dominates or  if a member  is  risk neutral.  These
certainty case results match the  findings  of Putterman (1980).
a.  An increase  in the  cohesion conjecture increases
cooperative  labor if  cooperative  income  is  divided
equally, a - 1.
With equal sharing, everyone benefits  from the  increasing production
because the  decline  in relative shares  does not affect the  distribution of
the  increased income.
b.  An increase in the cohesion conjecture decreases
cooperative  labor  if cooperative  income  is  distributed
only according  to relative  labor shares, a - 0.
The decline  in a member's  relative labor  share caused by the  increase
in the  cohesion conjecture outweighs  the potential  increase in income  if  the
cooperative  is  operating in the efficient zone where average product is
greater than marginal product.
c.  For values of a between 0 and 1, the  cooperative labor
response  to an increase in the cohesion conjecture
depends on worker type.
Individualists are more likely than cooperativists to  increase
cooperative labor for an increase  in the cohesion conjecture.
Individualists  free ride  if  any portion of the net cooperative  income  is
divided equally because they contribute  less than average.  Thus,  the larger
the value  of a, the greater  the benefits  to  individualists for  increases  in
12the  cohesion conjecture.
2.  Variance Effect
The certainty case results, however, can be overpowered by the variance
and wealth effects  of an increase in  the cohesion conjecture.  If the
variance effect dominates,  the following results hold for an  increase in  the
cohesion conjecture.
a.  An increase  in the  cohesion conjecture increases
cooperative  labor if  cooperative labor is  risk reducing
at the margin, gc'  <  0.
When the variability effect dominates, the possible loss  in relative
labor shares  is overshadowed by the desire to  reduce variability.  A member
will always  increase cooperative labor supply if more members will  follow
since  the  increased participation reduces variability.
b.  An increase  in the cohesion conjecture decreases
cooperative labor  if marginal cooperative
labor increases  risk, gc'  > 0, and
gc' > (1 - a)/[l + a(hC/hc)  - 1]  g/Hc.
Because a member's relative  labor share  is  reduced by an  increase in
the cohesion conjecture, a member can spread risk by increasing cooperative
labor.  However, for values of gC  above  the  specified threshold, the  risk
spreading potential is  overwhelmed by the  increase  in  risk.  Note,  if income
is  divided equally, risk cannot be  spread so members will always  decrease
cooperative labor.
3.  Wealth Effect
The  third effect of a change  in  the cohesion conjecture  is through  the
impact on wealth.  This  effect  consists of  (1)  the  elasticity of absolute
13risk aversion divided by expected wealth, y/w;  (2)  the  effect on wealth due
to  an  increase in the cohesion conjecture,  6y/Sr;  and (3) the  effect on net
income  of an increase in cooperative  labor, Sy/Shc.  We have assumed the
elasticity of absolute risk aversion is between 0 and 1, and the magnitude
and direction of the  other two elements varies among members.  An increase
in  the cohesion conjecture can either increase or decrease a member's
wealth, depending on how income  is divided and what  type of worker  the
member  is,  and an increase  in cooperative labor can either increase or
decrease  a member's  income  depending on which activity is  more profitable at
the margin.  The following results  indicate  the wealth effect  impacts on
cooperative  labor supply when an increase  in the cohesion conjecture
increases wealth.
a.  An increase in  the cohesion conjecture increases
cooperative labor  if cooperative labor  is  the more  risky
activity.
b.  An increase in  the cohesion conjecture decreases
cooperative labor  if  cooperative  labor is  the less risky
activity.
Risk is  reduced when an increase in the cohesion conjecture  increases
wealth,  8y/S6  > 0.  A member's  labor response will depend on which activity
is  riskier at  the margin.  If Sy/Shc > 0, a member will  increase cooperative
labor;  if  6y/6hc < 0, a member will reduce cooperative  labor.
In summary, a member's cooperative  labor response to an increase in  the
cohesion conjecture  is determined by the  sum of the mean, variance, and
wealth effects.  The direction of the  response is  indeterminate without
knowing the relative magnitudes  of the three effects.  Risk aversion
14considerations  can override the  certainty case responses  indicated by the
mean effect.
B. The Impact of an Increase  in  the Proportion of Cooperative Income
Distributed According to Work Supplied.  (1 - a)
The  labor response  depends strongly on worker  type.  Members whose
supply to  the  cooperative is  less than average generally do  not respond to
greater weight being placed on relative shares.  In addition, the  increase
in direct rewards  for increased cooperative labor  does not always  offset the
possible increased risk due  to  increased labor:
1.  Mean Effect
If the mean effect dominates or  if a member is  risk neutral, the
following certainty case result holds.
a.  An increase  in the weight given to relative
participation increases  cooperative labor allocation
among nonindividualist members.
An  increase in (1 - a) increases  the marginal income of members
contributing at least  the average  thereby enhancing their willingness  to
participate  in the  collective activity.
2.  Variance Effect
If the variance effect dominates,  the following results hold.
a.  Cooperativists will reduce cooperative  labor if
cooperative labor  is  risk increasing at the margin and
private labor  is  risk reducing at the margin.
The potential income benefits due  to  increased weight given to
cooperative  labor participation are overridden by risk considerations.  It
is  possible individualists may increase cooperative  labor in this  case
15because they do not carry their  share of the  increased risk burden for
increases  in cooperative  labor.
b.  Average workers will decrease cooperative  labor when
their cooperative labor  reduces risk.
3.  Wealth Effect
The  impact of the  third effect or wealth effect on cooperative labor
depends  on worker type  and which activity is  riskier and more profitable at
the margin.  (Recall cooperative labor  is  the risky, more profitable
activity if,  at the  optimal labor allocation, Sy/6hc > 0.)  An increase  in
rewards based on relative participation decreases  wealth for an
individualist and increases wealth for a cooperativist.  Therefore,  the
wealth effect will encourage individualists  to increase  the insurance
activity and for cooperativists to  increase  the  risky activity.
In summary, a members'  cooperative labor response to  an increase in
(1 - a) is generally indeterminate.  Without information on parameter
values, only risk-neutral members contributing at least  the average  can be
identified as  increasing cooperative labor for  increases  in payment based on
relative share.
The  impact of a change  in income correlation and cooperative  income
variability refer  to  changes  in  the variance and correlation of eP and ec,
the pure errors of private and cooperative income.  A change  in these
parameters  only affects  the  labor allocation decision through the variance
effect.  There is  no mean and wealth effect in the comparative static
equation.
16C.  The  Impact of a Decrease in Income Correlation, p
A decrease  in income correlation reduces risk.  A member will  increase
labor to  the  risky, more profitable activity when risk is  reduced.
1.  A decrease  in income correlation decreases cooperative
labor  if the  income variability elasticities,
pC  =  Sgc/$HC  HC/g and  pP - 6pP/6Hc  hP/gP, are  equal
and risk increasing.
An hour contributed to private production increases risk more  than an
hour contributed to cooperative production because the  increased risk in  the
cooperative activity is shared by other members.
2.  A decrease  in income correlation increases  cooperative
labor  if the  income variability elasticities  are equal
and risk decreasing.
An increase  in cooperative labor  reduces risk less than an equivalent
increase  in private production because in the cooperative activity the
decrease  in risk is  diluted through sharing.
3.  A decrease in income correlation increases  the  labor
activity which increases variability if  the  income
variability elasticities have  the opposite  effect.
4.  When both labor activities have  the same  effect  on risk
but are unequal, the labor allocation response  depends
on the relative magnitudes  of the  income variability
elasticities.
If both labor activities  increase risk, members will reduce cooperative
labor for decreases  in correlation as  long as marginal cooperative  labor is
relatively less  risk increasing.  This condition is  represented by:
171  HC  Pc <  ^  P  - (1 - )  (1 - ) v  [1  + a (hC/hc ) 1]  1  hc
-
Similarly, if both  labor activities decrease  risk, members will increase
cooperative  labor for decreases  in correlation as  long as private labor has
the relative advantage  in reducing risk.  This condition  is  represented by:
1  HC I~Cl  <  ^ P IWcI  <  A  I(PP:  ~~ - (1  - a) (1  - I) q  [1  + a  (hc/hc)  1]  l  hc
D.  TheImpact of a Decrease in  Cooperative  Income Variabilit  a2
c
With positive  income  correlation, a decrease in the cooperative
variability decreases  the riskiness  of both private and cooperative
activity.  Therefore,  the labor allocation response  to a decrease  in
cooperative  income variability will be to  increase  labor in the  riskier
activity.  (We assume the correlation of private and cooperative
agricultural income  is nonnegative.)
1.  If cooperative and private  labor have  the  opposite
effect  on variability at  the margin, a member will
increase labor  in the  activity which increases
variability.
2.  If both labor activities  decrease risk, members will
increase cooperative labor as  long as private  labor has
the relative  advantage  in reducing risk.
This  condition is represented by:
181  gP ap  pHCI\PI
Cl  <  ^  (1 - a) (1  - I) +  p
17  [1  + a(hC/hc)  - 1]  (gP ap p  + 2AgC ac)  (1 - hc)
3.  If both labor activities  increase risk, members will
decrease cooperative  labor as  long as  cooperative  labor
is  relatively less risk increasing than private  labor.
This condition is represented by:
c1  fgP  ap pHc  pP
Vc <  ^  (1  - a) (1  - I)
n  [1  + a(hC/hc)  - 1]  (gP ap p + 2Agc ac)  (1 - hc)
The  impact on cooperative  labor allocation for decreases  in income
correlation and cooperative  income variability indicate that policies aimed
at reducing cooperative  income uncertainty do not guarantee  risk averse
members will increase cooperative participation.  Moreover,  the results
identify the  conditions under which members will decrease cooperative
participation for decreases  in cooperative  income uncertainty.
IV.  CONCLUSION
The paper incorporated uncertainty and risk aversion into  the decision
process  of a cooperative member allocated labor between private and
collective  activities.  It  is found that responses to policy changes  can be
decomposed into  three components:  mean effect,  the response under risk
neutrality  (or certainty);  variance effect,  responses  resulting from policy
impacts  on the variance of  income;  and wealth effect,  the response  resulting
from changes  in risk aversion associates with changes  in wealth.
19The  incorporation of uncertainty and risk aversion extends  the set of
parameters affecting labor allocation decisions  to  include variance-
covariance parameters of private and collective  incomes.  This enables us  to
analyze effects  on cooperative labor supply of policies aimed at reducing
risk.  Moreover,  it  is  demonstrated that results  obtained under certainty
may be  reversed due  to  dominating variance effects.
Although the  theoretical framework presented here  expands the  existing
literature,  two  further extensions are  especially pertinent.  In the model
presented here,  total labor  time  is  assumed constant which ignores  the
labor-leisure choice.  Future analysis  should allow variability among
members'  labor time  to reflect  taste and endowment differences.  If leisure
is  included in the present general model, none of  the results are signable.
To obtain unambiguous  results, a specific functional form will have  to be
assumed.
Issues  of existence  and stability of equilibrium positions within
cooperatives need to be  analyzed.  General equilibrium conditions  are
especially important when member  interaction is  included.  As  the model
presented here  is a partial equilibrium model, it does not explicitly
consider equilibrating forces within the  cooperative.  Here the behavior of
the  individual members  is depicted under a given assumption regarding other
members' responses.  Future  research should identify conditions under which
equilibrium can be maintained and the  conditions under which utility-
maximizing members will have positive cohesion conjecture.
20APPENDIX
1.  The directional effect of a change  in q  on cooperative labor supply
is  obtained from the following comparative static  equation: 6
dhc  yC 
- s -(1  - a) - +  a  - - ye'
d7l  Hch c
1  h c g  C
R(gP  apc + Agc o2)  1[  + a  - 1)  g'  - (1 - a)
c  hc h-
+  -- 7) (1 - )  - a  +  Yc  1  + a  - 1)  - y'
\  He  hC  y_  j
SHC  hc  a  he 
(l-  ) - +  - (1 - a)  y
Hc  N  Hc
If the  mean income effect  dominates the variability effect, the
direction of the cooperative  labor response to  an increase in  n  is  strongly
influenced by the  rules  that govern the distribution of cooperative  income.
With equal income  distribution, a - 1, the positive marginal income  term
dominates,  and members increase their cooperative participation (result
A.l.a.).  When a equals 0, the negative  average income  term dominates  since
the cooperative  is  assumed to be operating in the efficient production zone
where YC/Hc >  yc'  (result A.l.b.).  Each member has a critical value for a
above which he/she increases  cooperative labor  for increases  in I.  This
critical value is:4
21(yC/HC  +  yC')
a  - A
(yC/HC) +  yc' - y'(hC/hC)
A
The critical a value  is greater  for cooperativists  (hC/hc < 1) than  for
A
individualists  (hc/hc > 1).  Thus,  individualists  are more likely to
increase cooperative labor  for  increases  in the  cohesion conjecture for  any
given value of a  < 1 (result A.l.c.).
If  the variability effect  dominates  the mean income effect,  the
direction of the cooperative  labor response to  an  increase in n  is strongly
influenced by the marginal effect to labor  on income variability, gc'.  If
gC'  is  negative, the variability effect is positive, and members will
increase cooperative labor  (result A.2.a.).  If gC'  is  positive and a  < 1,
the  cooperative labor response depends on the relative size  of the marginal
and average effect of labor  on variability (result A.2.b.).  If a  - 1 and
gC  is  positive, members will decrease labor.
2.  The directional effect of a change in  (1 - a) on cooperative  labor
supply is  obtained from the following comparative static equation:
dhc  y 
s  -(1  - ,)  +  - - 1  rY
da  HC  H  hc
1  gC
R  ((gP  apc + Agc a2)  . (1 - 7)  +  - c
2  hc HC  h c
+ g  (  - a)(  - - +  1 + a  - - 7'  gP
pc  "1  )(  Hc  )  H2
22l7  f  Y
1yC  \  hC
+ =  1  -a)(1  - ) - + n  1 +  -1  Yy
W  HC  HC
If the mean effect dominates,  cooperativists and average workers will
increase cooperative  labor because the mean effect is  negative for an
increase a, or positive for an increase in  (1 - a) (result B.l.a.).  For
individualists,  the coefficient  on the marginal  income  term is  negative,
and, therefore,  their labor response is  indeterminate.
For the variance effects, the  term premultiplied by -2R is  considered.
If  gc  is positive and gP'  is  negative,  the variance effect of an increase
A
in a is  positive for cooperativists because  (hC/hc) - 1 and (1/N - hC/Hc)
are  negative.  Therefore, for decreases in a, cooperativists will decrease
cooperative  labor (result B.2.a.).  For average members, the variance effect
is  always negative for a decrease  in a (result B.2.b.).
3.  The directional effect of a change  in correlation on cooperative
labor is  obtained from the  following comparative static  equation:
dhc  - Rgp gac  ap  1  - a)(  - ,) +  1+  a  h  7 - c  _
dp  2  C  -hc 
The coefficient  on pP  is > Hc and  is much larger  than the coefficient
of Pc.  Therefore,  if Vc - pP,  the third term within the bracket dominates
the  impact of a change  in correlation (result C.1  and C.2).  If 4 c < 0 and
pP  0 or Vc > 0 and VP < 0, the bracketed term is  negative, and members
will decrease cooperative  labor when correlation  is  reduced  (result C.3).
Result C.4  is  obtained by setting  the bracketed term to  0 and  solving for Vc
when  cC,  pP > 0 and Vc,  <p  < 0.
234.  The directional effect of a change  in cooperative  income
variability on cooperative  labor  is  obtained from the following comparative
static equation:
--  --R  (gP  ap p +  2Agc ac)  (1  - a)(1-  )  +  1 + 
dac 2  Hc 2 
HC  \
- PgP ap p  _-  .
1-hc
The results  in Section D are obtained in a manner similar  to  the
results in Section C.
24FOOTNOTES
1Let e - gkek with k - c, p.  Then, E(e) - 0 and var(e) - g2 2 . The
sign of g does  not affect the mean or variance.
2The subscript i is dropped for convenience.
3Various names have been given to  these  types of workers.  Chinn  (1980)
refers  to them as  lazy and industrious,  and Putterman (1981a)  refers  to  them
as shirkers  and zealots.  As our  labels  indicate the members' cooperative
labor supply relative to  the average, we  refrain from applying pejorative
labels.
4We assume  the cooperative  is  operating in the efficient zone where
YC/HC >  YC'
5As can be easily verified, equation (11)  is  a result of:
Fsy  _  ]  1  6V
E  (y  - -
I6hc^  j  2  6h c
where  y - yP + gPeP + Ayc + AgCec - y + gPeP + Agcec
V = gP2 2 + A2gC2 2  + 2gPAgCapc.
6The symbol s means  equal  in sign.
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